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HOME RULE, REVISITED
Left to themselves, the institutions of a local community can hardly strug-
gle against a strong and enterprising government; they cannot defend
themselves with success unless they have reached full development and
have come to form part of national ideas and habits. Hence, until com-
munalfreedom has come toformpart of mores, it can be easily destroyed,
and it cannot enter into mores without a long-recognized legal existence.
-A. deTocqueviile 1
It seems appropriate to recall Alexis de Tocqueville's prophetic
words during an era in which "new federalism" is promoted as a pan-
acea for social and economic ills. Home rule, introduced as a vehicle
for providing cities, towns, and counties with self-governing powers,
was developed in the late nineteenth century. The early home rule
movement was "fueled by widespread public indignation over exces-
sive legislative interference with and insensitivity toward local
problems and concerns, and by a growing dissatisfaction with the enor-
mously inefficient system of performing local lawmaking functions at
the state level."' A century later, home rule powers are being explored
and reconsidered, but the current movement is prompted not only by
the public's continued dissatisfaction with the inefficiencies of law-
making functions performed at the state level, but also by dissatisfac-
tion at the other end of the political spectrum. Today, because of the
federal government's focus on escalating administrative costs for fed-
eral level programs designed to remedy state and local problems, addi-
tional pressure exists to delegate power to local units of government.
Home rule returns legislative power to cities, towns, and counties
under the philosophy that those closest to the people can best minister
to their needs. In turn, such a delegation of power could in theory
reduce the federal government's responsibility for the social and eco-
nomic difficulties local units face.3 A twofold problem exists, however,
in that first, American cities seem unable to solve their current
problems or control their future development, and second, there is a
widespread perception of the powerlessness of American cities in this
1. A. DEToCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 62 (Lawrence trans. 1969). After wandering
across the country in the early 1830's deTocqueville reported that
The strength of free peoples resides in the local community. Local institutions are to
liberty what primary schools are to science; they put it within the people's reach, they
teach people to appreciate its peaceful enjoyment and accustom them to make use of
it. Without local institutions a nation may give itself a free government, but it has not
got a spirit of liberty.
id. at 63.
2. Ritchmount Partnership v. Board of Supervisors of Elections for Anne Arundel County, 283
Md. 48, 388 A.2d 523, 528-29 (1978).
3. Lectures on State and Local Government by Professor Douglas Kmiec, Notre Dame Law
School (Spring, 1982).
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regard.4 To compound the problem, case law reveals a distinct judicial
reluctance to allow localities the freedom needed to effectively exercise
whatever self-governing powers they may have.5
A discussion of the history and theory of home rule will provide a
perspective through which to consider a case study of home rule in
Indiana. The Indiana General Assembly's recent efforts to reexamine
home rule and revitalize the "institutions of its local communities," re-
sulted in a single volume of statutes pertaining to state and local gov-
ernment, Title 36.6 Most of these provisions became effective on
September 1, 1981.
Proponents of Title 36 suggest that consolidated provisions pertain-
ing to local government will call more attention to the legal existence of
municipal powers and rights, thus facilitating their exercise.7 Despite
this optimism, a number of obstacles and unresolved problems remain.
A major concern centers around the ability of cities, towns, and coun-
ties with home rule authority to replace, reorganize, or eliminate insti-
tutions implemented pursuant to federal legislation.
This note will analyze Indiana's attempt to deal with such an insti-
tution, the housing authority, under the recently passed Title 36. This
analysis will then be projected generally to speculate on the fate of
other institutions within the new climate of home rule.
THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF HOME RULE
In the absence of home rule or other express grants of power to
municipalities, state legislatures possess all legislative powers.' This
stems from the common law doctrine that municipalities were agents of
the state. As the Supreme Court noted in City of Newark v. New Jersey,
"[t]he regulation of municipalities is a matter peculiarly within the do-
main of the State."9
State legislature's absolute power over municipalities, however, did
not prove to vitiate local autonomy. In the mid-nineteenth century,
counties or townships comprised the most prevalent units of local gov-
ernment. Although they were "not constituted everywhere in the same
way," each operated under the same philosophy, "that each man is the
best judge of his own interest and the best able to satisfy his private
needs."10 The township or county took responsibility for meeting the
4. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1059, 1062 (1980).
5. See, e.g., Cheeks v. Cedlair Corporation, 287 Md. 595, 415 A.2d 255 (1980); Litten v. City of
Fargo, 294 N.W.2d 628 (N.D. 1980); Community Communications Company, Inc. v. City of
Boulder, Colorado, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
6. 1980 Ind. Acts Public Law 211, § 1. Section 1 explains that Title 36 is "intended to codify,
revise or rearrange applicable or corresponding provisions in prior statutes."
7. Interviews with Housing Authority directors at April 1982 NAHRO Convention in Elkhart,
Indiana.
8. Unless otherwise prohibited by federal and state constitutions. McBain, The Doctrine of an
Inherent Right of Local Sef-Government, 16 COLtJM. L. REv. 299, 300-03 (1916).
9. 262 U.S. 192, 196 (1923).
10. DETOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 82.
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needs of its local interests. For example, in Indiana, case law reveals
that the early nineteenth century was "a time when local autonomy was
the rule of law in Indiana."' In the words of an observer of nineteenth
century America, "the state rule[d] but [did] not administer."' 12
As urban areas developed and became more densely populated,
state legislatures began exercising their powers to govern these areas.
Railroads spanned the country, thus facilitating travel and linking state
and local regions.' 3 State legislatures involved themselves in the inter-
nal affairs of municipalities to assure that citizens obtained the needed
public services, such as water, gas, and transportation. At this time
there was a pervasive feeling that local officials were corrupt or inept,
and either case warranted increased state control and direction of mu-
nicipal affairs.' 4 By the late nineteenth century, "[1]egislation de-
scended into regulation of the minutest details of municipal
government." 15
Incidents of local resistance to increased state involvement in mu-
nicipal affairs could be detected by the 1870's. In those states where
local independence was politically backed, it achieved constitutional
protection in one of two ways. First, local units could gain initiative
power, which enabled them to provide particular services to their con-
stituents without prior state authorization. 16 Second, municipal gov-
ernments could be shielded from state legislation by a constitutional
provision limiting the state legislature's powers. Common limitations
during this period included the prohibitions of special or local
legislation. 17
In the absence of such prohibitions, the plenary power of the legisla-
ture over municipal corporations permitted the enactment of legisla-
tion directed at particular situations, thus enabling the legislature to
intervene in local affairs ... the legislature's power to enact legislation
applicable only to a single city deprived the city of the normal political
safeguards of statewide interest in the legislation; none but the resi-
dents of a single city would have any interest in such legislation and
they frequently lacked sufficient political influence to prevent the
interference.' 8
11. City of South Bend v. Krovitch, 149 Ind. App. 438, 443, 273 N.E.2d 288, 291 (1971). For a
thorough discussion of the parameters of local autonomy in the early nineteenth century in
Indiana, consult Ice, Munic4al Home Rule in Indiana, 17 IND. L.J. 375, 376-81 (1942).
12. DETOCQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 82.
13. WILSON, INDIANA, A HISTORY 188-90 (1977).
14. LITrLEFIELD, METROPOLrrAN AREA PROBLEMS AND MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 8 (1962).
15. Sandalow, The Limits of Munic7al Power Under Home Rule: A Rolefor the Courts, 48
MINN. L. REv. 643, 647 (1964).
16. See IDAHO CONsT. art. XII, § 2 which still empowers municipalities to enact, among other
things, local police and sanitation regulations. Additionally, art. I, § 2 provides that all polit-
ical power inheres in the people and that government is instituted for their benefit and equal
rotection. See also CAL. CONsT. art. II, § I, MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 1, UTAH CONST. art. 1,2.t
17. Walker, Towarda New Theory of Home Rule, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 571, 572 (1955). Cf. IND.
CONST. art. IV, § 22.
18. Sandalow, supra note 14, at 648-49.
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The two theories generally advanced to describe the distribution of
legislative powers among state and local government were the "crea-
ture theory" and "Dilon's Rule." These theories served, and continue
to serve, as guidelines for courts and legislatures in clarifying the status
and powers of municipalities, states, and seemingly autonomous
agencies.
Justice Peckham's 1905 Supreme Court decision in City of Worces-
ter v. Worcester Consolidated Street Railway Company19 concisely laid
out the creature theory. In Peckham's words, a municipality's power of
self-government could be revoked in the same manner as it was granted
because a "municipal corporation" was
simply a political subdivision of the State, and which exists by virtue of
the exercise of the power of the State through its legislative depart-
ment. The legislature could at any time terminate the existence of the
corporation itself, and provide other and different means for the gov-
ernment of the district comprised within the limits of the former city.
The city is the creature of the State (emphasis added).20
Dillon's Rule, a corollary of the creature theory, marked the specific
limits of the powers of municipal corporations. Named after Chief
Judge John J. Dillon, of the Iowa Supreme Court, the Rule provided
that municipal corporations possessed and could exercise the following
powers, and no others:
First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly
implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those es-
sential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of
the corporation,-not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair,
reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of the power is
resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is
denied.2'
Some courts developed the doctrine of "an inherent right of self-
government" to support claims of autonomy made by municipal corpo-
rations which lacked political clout.22 Essentially the doctrine pro-
posed that,
the people possess an inherent right, which antedates the Constitution,
19. 196 U.S. 539 (1905).
20. 196 U.S. 539, 548-49 (1905). ef. Massey v. City of Mishawaka, - Ind. App. -, 378 N.E.2d
14, 17 (1978): "Indiana municipal corporations are entities created by the State Legislature
and possess only those powers granted to them by the State."
21. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448-50 (5th ed. 1911).
Expressed by Judge Dillon in Merriam v. Moody's Executors, 25 Iowa 163 (1868). The Iowa
legislature overruled Dillon's rule in 1951. The very court which a century before had an-
nounced the rule accepted its repeal. Richardson v. City of Jefferson, 257 Iowa 709, 134
N.W.2d 528 (1965).
Cf. City of Logansport v. Public Service Commission, 202 Ind. 523, 530-31, 177 N.E.2d
249, 251 (1931): "Municipal corporations are subordinate branches of domestic government
of the state and possess only those powers expressly granted to them by the Legislature, those
necessarily or fairly "mllied in or incident to powers expressly granted, and those indispensa-ble to the delared objects and purposes of the corporation."
22. McBain, supra note 8.
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to govern themselves locally, that the Constitution is a grant of power,
and that all power not delegated by it remains in 'the local communi-
ties,' rather than in the state, exempt from legislative interferences. 23
First advanced in the late nineteenth century by Judge Cooley,24 the
doctrine never overcame Dillon's Rule in a majority of the states. In
effect, a majority of the states had "inherent right of self-government"
language in their constitutions, but, under Dillon's Rule, the judiciary
had acquired a veto power of sorts. The judiciary played the role of
super-legislature by determining when a municipality had properly ex-
ercised its authority and when the state had overstepped its bounds.
25
Meanwhile, state-local relationships continued to grow more com-
plicated and it became increasingly difficult for state legislatures to
keep local governments functioning properly. The functions of cities
had expanded beyond the simple and limited areas of the past. "[A]s
state legislative burdens increased, cities received less attention and be-
gan to feel the pinch of Judge Dillon's legacy to local government."
26
Missouri pioneered the first constitutional grant of home rule in
1875.27 Under the grant's criteria only one Missouri municipality qual-
ified, St. Louis. The avowed purpose of home rule was to alleviate the
limitations Dillon's Rule imposed upon the exercise of local govern-
ment functions. The Missouri legislature assumed that if it gave cities
exclusive powers by constitutional provision(s), the state legislature
would refrain from enacting laws which interfered with local powers of
self-government. 2
8
California followed the Missouri model four years later.29 Califor-
nia learned, however, that its courts had maintained the spirit, though
they did not purport to apply the letter, of Dillon's Rule by literally
construing the constitutional grant of home rule. The phrase "subject
to and controlled by general laws," within California's grant of home
rule, had the effect of eviscerating most self-government efforts. This
created such great problems for local units that in 1896 California had
to amend this clause by adding, "except in municipal affairs."' 30 Fi-
nally in 1914 California revised its home rule provisions to give an af-
23. City ofLogansport, 202 Ind. at 530-31, 177 N.E. at 251. This doctrine was first announced in
Indiana cases in State ex reL Jameson v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 21 N.E. 252 (1889). Indiana's
1816 Constitution provided that "[a]llpower is inherent in the people, and free government
is founded on their authority and instituted for their peace, safety and happiness."
24. People ex rel. LeRoy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (1871). Indiana and Michigan were two of the
four states in which this doctrine met with success.
25. Courts borrowed the rule of ultra vires from the law of corporations and used it in conjunc-
tion with Dillon's Rule. "Expressio unius excluso alterius" and the "ejusdem generis" doc-
trines were also used to "fetter local units." Walker, supra note 17, at 578.
26. Sharp, Home Rule in Alas/a." A Clash Between the Constitution and the Court, 3 U.C.L.A.-
ALASKA L. REV. 1, 2 (1973).
27. MO. CONST. art. IX, §§ 16-25 (1875).
28. Schmandt, Mlunici#al Home Rule in Missouri, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 385.
29. CAL. CONST., art. XI, § 6 (1879).
30. Sato, AlunicipalAffairs in Calfornia, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1055-56 (1972); Peppin, Aunici-
pal Home Rule in Calfornia: I, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6-37 (1941).
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firmative grant of power to municipalities. 31 By this time eleven other
states had authorized constitutional home rule provisions. 32
To date, forty states have written grants of home rule power into
their constitutions.33 Other states, like Indiana and North Dakota, re-
linquished their powers in a piecemeal legislative fashion rather than
by amending the state constitution.
A constitutional grant of home rule authority differs markedly from
a legislative grant. On the surface, a constitutional grant of home rule
authority establishes the domain of local units of government. Al-
though the local governments must continue to comply with the state's
constitutional provisions and statutes, they remain free to fashion for
themselves a system of government.34 In many jurisdictions, "as a pre-
requisite to exercising home rule powers, municipalities have been re-
quired to adopt charters or 'municipal constitutions' drafted by local
charter commissions selected according to terms prescribed by the state
constitution or by state law."35 State legislatures may not revoke local
units' autonomy because the unit derives its authority from the very
source of the legislature's authority, the state constitution.
A closer inspection of the constitutional grant of home rule author-
ity indicates, however, that power distribution between a local gov-
erning body and the state involves a "subtle blend" of state legislation
and constitutional provisions. State and local governmental powers,
rights, duties, and obligations expand and contract in accordance with
the mandates and prohibitions contained in the legislation and consti-
tutional provisions.36
Regardless of the source of municipal corporations' powers of self-
government, home rule never constitutes a grant of absolute autonomy
within the state. "[H]ome rule cities must always remain integral parts
of state government and must assume, like non-home rule cities, re-
sponsibility for enforcement of state law."' 37 Consequently, a legisla-
ture or court reviewing grants of home rule authority must carefully
consider whether local units of government will be able to meet the
unique demands of their constituents while functioning effectively as
one of many distinct units in the state.38
31. Id. Sato, supra note 29.
32. Vanlandingham, Munic4al Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REv. 269,
277 (1968).
33. See Appendix, infra, p. 244.
34. But see Litten v. City of Fargo, 294 N.W.2d 628, where the North Dakota Supreme Court
held that a home rule city does not have authority to select any form of government it may
desire.
35. Vanlandingham, supra note 32, at 280. Arguably, the Indiana General Assembly wishes to
have home rule units fashion their own systems of government by codifying and enacting
their statutes.
36. For an interesting discussion of the interplay of the state's and municipality's powers in
Hohfeldian terms consult Anderson, Resolving State/Local Governmental Conflict - A Tale of
Three Cities, 18 URB. L. ANN. 129 (1980).
37. Vanlandingham, supra note 32, at 280.
38. Id.
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The attention American courts and legislatures have devoted to the
concept of home rule for over one hundred years has resulted in count-
less meanings and descriptions. "Home rule" has served as both "a
political symbol and a legal doctrine. ' 39 Legislatures purport to adopt
home rule to immunize municipalities from the control and direction of
state legislatures or to give local governments the initiative to exercise
police power, license trades, and businesses, or regulate health and
human services without specific state authorization. In these senses,
home rule serves as a political symbol. When used as a means for allo-
cating powers among state and local governments and agencies, home
rule serves as a legal doctrine.
In any case, "home rule" has escaped precise definition. Legal
scholars suggest that "any legal change which strengthens the legal po-
sition of cities in relation to the state" 4 constitutes a form of home rule.
Such usage is referred to as the "state of mind" form of home rule or as
the application of federalism to the state-local relationship.41 At the
other end of the spectrum, home rule in its most comprehensive sense
includes:
(1) the choice of the character of the municipal organization, that is,
the selection of the charter, (2) the nature and scope of the municipal
service, and (3) all local activity, whether in carrying out or enforcing
state law or municipal regulations, in the hands of city or town officers,
selected by the community4 2
Home rule may be more accurately described as "the autonomy of
local government in the sovereign state over all purely local matters. 43
First, this formulation reflects a desirable jurisprudential effect of home
rule, to allow the governmental unit closest to the people to minister to
their needs and afford them the privileges and protections of the law.
Second, no home rule grant provides a city, town, or county with blan-
ket immunity from state and federal laws and regulations." This defi-
nition makes it clear that a properly functioning local governmental
unit must meet the unique needs of its people in those areas that laws
targeted at the general public cannot address. Unfortunately, this defi-
nition leaves the decision of what constitutes a "purely local matter" up
to the judiciary.45
39. Ruud, Legislative Jurisdiction of Texas Home Rule Cities, 37 TEx. L. REv. 682 (1959).
40. Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law Exception, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 671,
674 (1973).
41. Vanlandingham, supra note 32, at 279.
42. 1 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION § 43 (1940).
43. Vanlandingham, supra note 32, at 280. Seemingly this is the formulation of home rule the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had in mind when it decided Metropolitan Housing Devel-
opment Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980) (p. 6, n.17).
44. See, eg., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
45. Note, Defining "Municipal or Internal Affairs:" The Limits oPowerfor Indiana Cities, 49
IND. LJ. 482 (1974). Since there is no agency to interpose a more neutral judgment as to
what constitutes a state affair and what is really a municipal affair, the author of this law
review note suggests that the courts are the best supervisors.
1983]
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HOME RULE IN INDIANA
In 1978 Indiana organized the Local Government Study Commis-
sion to study the organization, financing, and management of local
government units over a three-year period.46 The Commission used
the data it collected to stimulate annual legislative proposals. Ulti-
mately, the Commission drafted legislation designed to create a polit-
ical climate conducive to local units handling the responsibilities of
self-government.47
Article I of Title 36 provides the "cornerstone" for the Commis-
sion's comprehensive recodification.48 At the heart of Article I lies the
"home rule" chapter.4 9 By synthesizing the provisions of the Powers of
Cities Act (Indiana Code § 18-1-1.5), Powers of Counties Act (Indiana
Code § 17-2-2.5) and Unigov Act (Indiana Code § 18-4-2) the Com-
mission intended to strengthen the local units' powers of self-govern-
ment. The Commission declared,
This new Home Rule law should serve to clarify that these units do
indeed have extensive discretion in carrying out their local functions,
but it does not extend to them certain powers that are denied under
present law. For instance, the local units are still prohibited from im-
posing any tax not specifically provided by statute, and they are still
unable to regulate activity that is subject to regulation by a state
agency .... As one might expect, the Home Rule powers are not
without their limits.... Like traditional local government powers,
Home Rule- powers are delegated powers; they have been freely given
and may be freely limited or taken away by the General Assembly.5"
This built-in concept of "delegation" creates a conflict. Although
the statute concentrates on the local units' powers, the drafters' ap-
proach focuses on the power of the legislature to assign its functions to
a variety of governmental units. Among the strata of governmental
units, home rule units do not occupy a preferred spot.5 '
The unspoken assumption is that the state legislature represents the
46. Ind. Pub. L. 170 (1978).
47. Local Government Study Commission, Understanding the New Local Government Law
(June 1, 1981) (unpublished report). Proposed constitutional amendments granting "home
rule" powers to local units were twice rejected by the Indiana legislature. H.J. Re. 5, ch. 243
[1941] Ind. Acts 967; S.J. Res. 2, ch. 289 [1953] Ind. Acts 1021. See Note, Local-State Rela-
tions in Indiana: Proposed Charter Making Powers for Municipalities, 30 IND. L.J. 265, 266
n.7 (1955).
48. Art. I, General Provisions; art II, Government of Counties; art. III, Government of Consoli-
dated Cities and Counties (Unigov); art. IV, Government of Cities and Towns Generally; art.
V, Government of Towns; art. VI, Government of Townships; art. VII, Planning and Devel-
opment; art. VIII, Public Safety;, art. IX, Transportation and Public Works; art. X, Recrea-
tion, Culture, and Community Facilities.
49. Although the Cities & Towns Act of 1905 authorized cities to license, tax, and regulate under
specified circumstances, the General Assembly never really accepted the concept that local
governments should have broader authority to determine the scope of their own governmen-
tal activities until the passage of the Consolidated Cities and Counties Act of 1969 (Unigov
Act - Former I.C. § 18-4 et seq.). See note 47.
50. Local Government Study Commission Report, supra note 47.
51. See IND. CODE § 36-1-3-5 (1980).
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sole safe bursar of governmental power. Any legislative attempt to
grant home rule authority to local units must operate against a back-
drop of judicial reluctance to part with common law rules regarding
municipal corporations. To overcome a local unit's exercise of home
rule authority, a court can merely challenge the legislature's power to
delegate such authority without state constitutional authority.52 Given
the hostile judicial attitude in this state toward self-governed local
units, this speculation is not far-fetched. For example, Indiana's
Supreme Court recently held that,
[t]he Legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law; but it can
make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of
things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action
depend. An administrative body can be delegated the responsibility,
methods, or details necessary to implement the law enacted by the
Legislature.53
The Indiana legislature appears to have charged local units seeking
self-government with the difficult task of navigating between Scylla
and Charybdis. In conducting local or municipal affairs,54 local units
must not come within the jurisdiction of federal, state, and local agen-
cies or any superior law-making body. Even if nimble local units avoid
this many-faceted problem and the state legislature does not revoke its
grant in the interim, a strict judicial interpretation of legislative delega-
tion may swallow any remaining powers of self-government possessed
by the home rule unit.
To complicate the problem, Indiana's legislature has neither made
an absolute grant of home rule authority, nor has it extended the home
rule provisions to all municipal corporations. According to Title 36,
"all units except townships" may exercise home rule powers. 51 "Units"
includes county, municipality, or township.5 6 The statute defines "mu-
nicipality" as a city or town.57 The home rule provisions, therefore,
apply only to cities, towns, and counties.
The Indiana Constitution and statutes limit the power that a home
rule unit may exercise.58 Home rule units may not exercise any powers
expressly granted to other entities, 59 nor may they exercise their powers
in areas outside their geographical boundaries.60 Additionally, section
eight6' of the home rule chapter lists eleven powers a unit does not
52. See, eg., Phillips v. City of Atlanta, 210 Ga. 72, 77 S.E.2d 723 (1953); Elliott v. City of
Detroit, 121 Mich. 611, 84 N.W. 820 (1899); State v. Thompson, 149 Wis. 488, 137 N.W. 20
(1912).
53. Stanton v. Smith, - Ind. -, 429 N.E.2d 224, 228 (1981).
54. IND. CODE § 36-1-3-6 describes the specific manner for exercising a power.
55. IND. CODE § 36-1-3-1 (1980).
56. Id. § 36-1-2-23.
57. Id. § 36-1-2-11.
58. Id. 36-1-3-5(1).
59. Id. § 36-1-3-5(2).
60. Id. § 36-1-3-9 provides that home rule units may enter into an express agreement under
§ 36-1-7.
61. Id. § 36-1-3-8. Curiously, other than a municipality's exclusive jurisdiction over bridges
1983]
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have in the absence of state law" authorization. This list includes: the
power to regulate activities which the state already regulates; the power
to impose duties on other governmental units; the power to impose a
license fee in an amount which exceeds reasonable administrative costs;
and the power to regulate private civil relationships.
In light of these restrictions, it appears that Title 36 fails to clarify
the "extensive discretion" local governmental units have in carrying
out their local functions. Additionally, the Repealer Bills may have
local government decision-makers so buried in paperwork that adopt-
ing ordinances which may be totally inconsistent with neighboring
units' ordinances will become the sole function of home rule units. If
local government units fail to replace the statutes with ordinances, they
may no longer exercise the powers currently granted by the statutes.
Ironically, Title 36, intending to grant extensive powers to local units,
may have reduced those powers thus impairing their ability to function
as integral parts of state government.
THE FATE OF HOUSING AUTHORITIES: A CASE IN POINT
In effect, the home rule provisions of Title 36 do not differ in sub-
stance from the home rule provisions which have been in effect for the
past decade.62 The Indiana statutes which establish housing authorities
remain virtually unchanged since their enactment in 1937.63 Mean-
while, as the Local Government Study Commission examined home
rule and prepared Title 36, Indiana courts continued to apply the spirit,
if not the letter, of Dillon's Rule. Within this context, if a city, town, or
county tried to exercise its home rule powers to abrogate or eliminate
the authority of an agency functioning within its territory, the provi-
sions of the Indiana Code would likely receive a strict judicial interpre-
tation which would keep the municipality in check.
In 1937, Indiana enacted the Housing Authorities Act (the "Act")
intending to eliminate unsanitary, unsafe, and unhealthy dwellings. 64
In each city, county, and town where these conditions existed, the legis-
lature provided for the creation of a "public body corporate and poli-
tic," the "housing authority. ' 65  The Act has always provided the
following three methods for a city, town, or county to determine
whether or not it needed a housing authority: the governing body
could, on its own motion, make a proper resolution declaring that such
a need existed; the governing body could make a proper resolution fol-
lowing a petition signed by twenty-five residents of the city, town, or
(subject to § 8-16-3-1), streets, alleys, sidewalks, watercourses, sewers, drains and public
grounds, home rule units are not given the express power to do anything in particular.
62. IND. CODE § 36-1-3-1 et seq. (1980) (formerly §§ 18-1-1.5, 18-4-2, and 17-2-2.5).
63. Now IND. CODE § 36-7-18-1 et seq. as added by Acts 1981, P.L. 309, § 37. Formerly IND.
CODE § 18-7-11-1 et seq. (and before that, § 48-8 101 et seq.). These provisions have been
rewritten for clarity's sake since 1937 but otherwise remain unchanged.
64. Edwards v. Housing Authority, 215 Ind. 330, 19 N.E.2d 741 (1939).
65. Foirmerly IND. CODE § 18-7-11-4 [48-8104], now § 36-7-18-4 (1981).
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county who asserted that the city, town, or county needed a housing
authority functioning there; and, the state housing board could direct
the governing body to create a housing authority.66
Once a city, town, or county created a housing authority, the mayor
appointed five housing commissioners. These commissioners were au-
thorized to select technical experts, social workers, lawyers, and other
advisers to assist them in improving the quality and increasing the
quantity of housing for persons of low income. As a municipal corpo-
ration, the housing authority's powers have always included the follow-
ing: to sue and be sued; to prepare, carry out, acquire, lease, and
operate housing projects; to arrange or contract for the furnishing of
services and facilities in connection with a housing project; to invest
any funds held in reserves and to purchase bonds at a price not more
than the principal amount and accrued interest; and to make studies
and recommendations pertaining to the problems of replanning and re-
constructing slum or blighted areas.67 Under no circumstances may a
housing authority initiate a project without first receiving approval of
the city, county, or town which activated it.6"
Now that the home rule provisions of Title 36 have become effec-
tive, it is doubtful that cities, towns, or counties will have more power
to interfere with the activities of housing authorities than they had
prior to September 1, 1981. For example, article I, section 24 of Indi-
ana's Constitution provides that no "law impairing the obligation of
contracts, shall ever be passed." Since the relation between a city,
county, or town and its housing authority in itself is a contract, the state
legislature cannot empower local government units to back out of their
arrangement with a housing authority in the name of exercising its
home rule authority. Additionally, when viewed as separate contracts
housing projects approved prior to September 1, 1981, must remain inforce.69
Moreover, if a constitutional or statutory provision sets out a spe-
cific manner for exercising a power, a unit remains bound, under the
home rule chapter, to exercise the power in the manner specified. 0
Any city, deciding to rehabilitate a housing project could act only "to
the extent that the power. . . is not expressly granted to another en-
tity." Clearly the Act empowers housing authorities to exercise this
66. IND. CODE § 36-7-18-4 (1981); now the "fiscal body" declares when there is a need for an
authority in the unit, rather than the "governing body." § 36-1-2-6 defines "fiscal body" as:
(1) county council, for a county not having a consolidated city; (2) city-county council, for a
consolidated city or county having a consolidated city; (3) common council, for a city other
than a consolidated city; (4) board of trustees, for a town; (5) advisory board, for a township;
or (6) governing body or budget-approval body, for any political subdivision.
67. IND. CODE §§ 36-7-18-1 et seq.
68. § 36-7-18-14.
69. See, eg., Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Harmody, 474 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir.
1973); Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, 38 Cal. 2d 853,
243 P.2d 515, ceri. denied 344 U.S. 836 (1952).
70. IND. CODE § 36-1-3-6.
71. Id. § 36-1-3-5(2).
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power. Were a city to decide to assume such a project, their acts could
be subject to the review and regulation of the local housing authority.72
Unless the need for a housing authority ceases to exist, it does not seem
possible for a home rule unit to alter its relation with the housing
authority.
The vast majority of courts have held that the housing authority,
rather than being subject to the control and direction of the municipal
corporation, becomes a complete corporate entity in itself.7 3 Courts
have generally reached this conclusion by considering the municipality
and housin authority as co-equal entities with identical territorial ju-
risdictions7 or by classifying the housing authority as a state agency
"created to discharge a public object essential to the public interest."'75
In a few cases courts have held that "[t]he housing authority is not a
political subdivision of the state. Once created it becomes an autono-
mous body, subject only to the limits of power imposed by law. [Hous-
ing authorities are not created for political purposes and [are] not
instruments of the government created for its own use or subject to its
direct control."7
6
The matter of the housing authorities dramatizes the actual effect
on municipalities of Indiana's legislative home rule grant. To place
cities, towns, and counties in a climate more conducive to the genuine
exercise of home rule powers, the legislature could have perhaps
shielded local units of government from the "pinch of Judge Dillon's
legacy," by attempting a constitutional grant of home rule rather than a
revision of statutes.
72. Id. § 36-1-3-7.
73. See, e.g., Wilmington Housing Authority v. Williamson, 228 A.2d 782 (Del. 1967); Johnson-
Forster Co. v. D'Amore Const. Co., 314 Mass. 416, 50 N.E.2d 89 (1943); Finance Commis-
sion of City of Boston v. McGrath, 343 Mass. 754, 180 N.E.2d 808 (1962); Atherton v. City of
Concord, 109 N.H. 164, 245 A.2d 387 (1968); City of Paterson v. Housing Authority of City
of Paterson, 96 N.J. Super, 394, 233 A.2d 98 (1967); Kelly v. Cohoes Housing Authority, 280
N.Y.A.2d 250, 27 A.D.2d 463 (1967), a'd, 243 N.E.2d 746, 23 N.Y.2d 692,296 N.Y.S.2d 139
(1968); Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Hampton Redevelopment and Housing Authority,
217 Va. 30, 225 S.E.2d 364 (1976); Mercy v. City of Seattle, 71 Wash. 2d 556, 429 P.2d 917
(1967).
74. Boardman v. Oklahoma City Housing Authority, 445 P.2d 412 (Okla. 1968), holding that a
housing authority is not an agency or instrumentality of the city or county in which it oper-
ates, nor is it a political corporation of subdivision of the state and therefore it is not subject
to debt limitations placed on cities, counties or other political subdivisions of the state.
75. See, e.g. Wilmington HousingAuthority, 228 A.2d 782, City of Fort Smith v. Housing Author-
ity of the City of Fort Smith, 256 Ark. 254, 506 S.W.2d 534 (1974); Arrowhead Redevelop-
ment Citizens Council v. Bd. of Cmmrs. of Denver, 42 Colo. App. 27, 595 P.2d 262 (1978).
76. Housing Authority of City of Woonsocket v. Fetzik, 110 RI. 26, 289 A.2d 658, 662 (1972).
Two decisions cannot be reconciled with the virtually unanimous majority view. Jones v.
Middlesex County Bd. of Elections, 259 F. Supp. 931 (D.C.NJ. 1966) holds that the housing
authority of the city of Perth Amboy is an agency of the city-yet later New Jersey cases
reach opposite conclusions and do not cite this decision. In 1980 the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals held that under Illinois' new constitutional grant of home rule municipalities
could supersede pre-existing legislative provisions limiting their authority through valid leg-
islative action. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights,
616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980). Perhaps this decision is what triggered the local housing
authorities' concern.
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CONCLUSION
In states like Indiana, the judiciary holds tight reins on local auton-
omy. Decisions indicate that regardless of legislative enactments and
the policy the legislature seeks to further, courts remain wed to com-
mon law doctrines pertaining to municipal corporations.77
"Home rule begins at home." Somehow in light of the judicial
resistance to home rule in Indiana it seems more plausible that "com-
munal freedom" in deTocqueville's sense has not yet come to form part
of Indiana's mores. The courts have demonstrated how easily the
home rule illusion of communal freedom can be destroyed.
Leslie Bender*
77. (a) Dillon's Rule (with ultra vires analysis)-City of Hammond, Lake County v. Indi-
ana Harbor Belt Railroad Company, - Ind. App. -, 373 N.E.2d 893, 897 (1978): "as an
instrumentality of the State, a City derives all its powersfrom the State and, unless a power is
expressly or impliedly given, it must be assumed that the power is non-existent."
(b) Creature Theory-Massey v. City of Mishawaka, - Ind. App. -, 378 N.E.2d 14,
17 (1978): "Indiana municipal corporations are entities created by the State Legislature and
possess only those powers granted to them by the State." (c) Occupation of the Field-
Board of Public Safety v. State, - Ind. App. -, 388 N.E.2d 582, 585, (1979): "If the state
does not choose to occupy an area to the exclusion of the municipal regulation, then a city
may impose additional, reasonable regulations. However, a city may not impose regulations
which are in conflict with rights granted or reserved by the General Assembly."
(d) Legislative Powers Not Delegable (decided three months after Title 36 became
effective)-Stanton v. Smith, - Ind. -, 429 N.E.2d 224, 228 (1981).
* B.A., Northwestern University, 1980; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 1983.
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APPENDIX
SURVEY OF HOME RULE IN THE UNITED STATES
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Source of Authority
ALA. CODE §§ 11-44-1 etseq.
(1975)
ALA. CONST. art. X, §§ 1, 9-11
ARIz. CONST. art. XII, §§ 1-6
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-1042 et
seq. (1980)
CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-3, 5, 7
COLO. CONST. art. XX, §§ 1, 6
CONN. COiNST. art. X, §§ 1-2
DEL. CONST. tit. 22, §§ 801-836
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1-6
GA. CONST. § 2-6001
GA. CODE ANN. ch. 69-10 (1976)
HAWAII CONST. art. VII, § 2
IDAHO CONST. art. XII, § 2
ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6
IND. CODE § 36-1-3-1 (1980)
IOWA CONST. art. 3, §§ 38A, 39A
KAN. CONST. art. XII, § 5
Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 83, 410 et seq.
(1982)
LA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4-9
ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 2, § 1
MD. CONST. art. XI-A, §§ 1-7; art.
XI-E, §§ 3-6; art. XI-F, §§ 1-10
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 5
MICH. CONST. art. VII, §§ 21, 22
MINN. CONST. art. XII, § 4
Miss. CONST. art. 4, § 88
MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-13-1 et
seq. (1972 & Supp. 1982)
Mo. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-9
MONT. CONST. art. XI, §§ 5, 6
NEB. CONST. art. XI, §§ 2, 5
NEV. CONST. art. VIII, § 8
N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 39
N.J. CONST. art. 4, § 7911
N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 40:69A-29-30
(1967)
N.M. CONST. art. X, §§ 4-6
N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW,
§§ 1 et seq. (McKinney 1969).
Comments
Commission
form
Gen. Assembly
empowered to
enact legis.
granting self-
govt.
Empowered by
Ky. Const. § 156
not exercised-
Interlocal Coop.
of Govt. Act
(1974)
[Vol. 10:231
Home Rule, Revisited
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 153A (1978)
N.D. CONST. art. VII
OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 7
OKLA. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1-7
OR. CONST. art. xi, § 2
PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2
R.I. CONST. amend. XXVIII, §§ 1-
12
S.C. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1-16
S.D. CONST. art. IX, § 2
TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 9
TEx. CONST. art. XI, § 5
UTAH CONST. art. XI, § 5
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2630 et
seq. (1977)
VA. CONST. art. VII
VA. CODE §§ 15.1-833-837
WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 10
W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 39(a)
WIs. CONST. art. XI, § 3
WYo. CONST. art. XIII, § 1(c)
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